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Abstract 
 
Significant positive stock price reaction to stock repurchase announcements has been well docu-
mented in the finance literature.  Most studies on repurchase focus on the average positive reac-
tion; however, 30 percent of the repurchasing firms experience negative abnormal returns at an-
nouncement.  This study examines the apparent heterogeneity in the stock price reaction to stock 
repurchase.  The results show that the market reaction to repurchase announcements is deter-
mined by firm specific factors and is based on the overall costs and benefits analysis by the market 
of the stock repurchase program.  The results are consistent with conventional signaling models 
and agency theories. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
t has been well documented in the finance literature that the stock market reacts positively to open-
market repurchase announcements.  The abnormal announcement returns are in the range of 2 - 4%.   
However, several studies, such as  Tsestekos (1993),  Erwin and Miller (1998), and Liu and Ziebart 
(1997), also report that while the average market reaction is positive, about 30% of the repurchasing firms in each of 
their study samples experience negative announcement returns.  So far, studies on market reaction to open market 
stock repurchase announcements have focused on the positive average market reaction to stock repurchase an-
nouncements rather than the apparent heterogeneity in the stock price reaction to repurchase announcements.   This 
paper tries to determine whether there are two fundamentally different types of repurchasing firms, with repurchases 
being viewed by the market as a positive event for one type and a negative event for the other.   The key issue is to 
determine whether the observed negative reaction for about 30% of the repurchasing firms reflects the market as-
sessment that, for some firms,  repurchasing stock is a value decreasing event. 
 
 Cross-sectional regressions using variables that proxy for the various determinants of the repurchase an-
nouncement returns are performed to test the relationship between market reaction and these firm specific factors.  
The regressions are run on the whole sample as well as the two subgroups: Group P, firms with positive market reac-
tion, and Group N, firms with negative market reaction.  The whole sample regression results indicate that market 
reaction to stock repurchase announcements is significantly related to several firm specific factors in the model.  The 
results of the two subgroup regressions indicate that the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are significantly posi-
tively related to the size of repurchase, as a percentage of the total shares outstanding,  for Group P and negatively 
related to the size of the repurchase for Group N.  The results are consistent with the notion that repurchase an-
nouncements are viewed by the market as good news for a subset of repurchasing firms and bad news for the rest.  
 
 A Chow test is also conducted to determine whether the firms in the two groups, classified by the signs of 
the announcement returns, are significantly different.  Variables employed in the regression model are used in the 
test.  The result of the test rejects that hypothesis that there is no difference between the two groups, suggesting that 
the firm specific factors of the firms with positive announcement returns are significantly different from those of the  
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firms with negative announcements returns.  The result of the Chow test is consistent with the regression results and 
further supports the notion that the differential market reaction to stock repurchase announcements is due to firm 
specific factors.  For firms with some characteristics, open-market repurchase announcements are viewed by the 
market as value-increasing while other firms‟ announcements are viewed by the market as value-decreasing. 
 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section one presents a literature review and provides some theoretical 
background for the models used in this paper. Section two presents the hypotheses, data and empirical methodology.  
Section three presents and discusses the test results.  Section four summarizes the study and provides a conclusion. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
 
 Many studies have documented the positive market reaction to stock repurchase announcements (Masulis 
1980, Dann 1981, Bradley and Wakeman 1983, Tsestekos 1993,  Erwin and Miller 1998, and Liu and Ziebart 1997).  
Information content of the repurchase announcements and signaling effects are often cited as reasons to explain the 
positive valuation effects.  Dann, Masulis and Mayers (1991) find evidence that stock repurchases often signal fu-
ture increases in earnings and a reduction of systematic risk around repurchase announcements. They also provide 
evidence that investors actually revise earnings estimates upwards following repurchase announcements.  Bartov 
(1991)  studies repurchases as signals for earnings and risk changes and finds that there are unexpected positive 
earnings in the announcement year and that there are upward revisions of earnings forecasts by analysts.  He also re-
ports that repurchase announcements are followed by decline in the repurchasing firms‟ common stock risk and that 
repurchase announcement returns are positively related to the earnings changes conveyed by these announcements.  
Healy and Palepu (1993) argue that managers in undervalued firms use dividend increase or stock repurchase to sig-
nal confidence to the market. 
 
 Agency cost reduction as a result of stock repurchases can also potentially explain the positive market reac-
tion.  Jensen (1986) argues that corporate dividend payments reduce the agency cost arising from managers‟ incen-
tives to use free cash flow to invest in negative NPV projects.  Repurchasing stocks significantly reduces the cash 
available to managers for potential  investments in negative NPV projects.  Easterbrook (1994) posits that corporate 
payout today increases the probability that the firm will need to seek external financing from the capital in the fu-
ture.  Therefore, there is a higher probability of managers being exposed to the monitoring associated with external 
financing.  This higher probability of future monitoring reduces the extent to which managers will deviate from 
stockholder wealth maximization, thus reducing the cost of the agency conflict between managers and stockholders. 
 
 Both the information content/signaling and agency cost arguments identify potential benefits of stock re-
purchase programs.  However, the actual economic impact of a stock repurchase will consist of these benefits netted 
against the potential costs associated with the repurchase program.  These costs include the increase in expected fi-
nancing costs (due to the higher probability of external financing) and any costs associated with the reduction in fi-
nancial slack (Black, 1976; Bhattacharya, 1979; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Thus, for a particular firm, if the market 
judges the benefits of repurchase to be smaller than the costs, the announcement returns could very well be negative.  
At the same time, if the repurchase announcement is interpreted by the market as a signal of deterioration in invest-
ment opportunities, the announcement effect could also be negative. 
 
 It is important to note that the signaling models and the Jensen and Easterbrook agency arguments both 
predict that the announcement effects should be positively related to the size of the repurchase program as a percent 
of the total number of shares outstanding.  Under these arguments, even when the total announcement effect is nega-
tive, there is still a benefit of stock repurchases that is positively related to the size of the repurchase.  Only when the 
repurchase itself is viewed as bad news, because it conveys a deterioration in investment opportunities, do we expect 
to see the announcement returns negatively related to the size of repurchase program. 
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3. Hypotheses, Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 
 The question addressed by this paper is whether stock repurchase is assessed by the market to be a value-
increasing event for some firms and a value-decreasing event for others. The fact that over 30 percent of repurchas-
ing firms experience negative abnormal returns does not, in itself, establish that such a dichotomy exists.  In an 
event study, some sample firms could exhibit negative abnormal returns ex post even if the average impact of the 
event is positive for all firms.  The observed abnormal announcement returns can be negative even when the true 
market reaction is actually positive due to the following reasons;  market anticipation of the event, errors in estimat-
ing abnormal return, and confounding events.  Thus, the key issue examined in this paper is whether the negative 
abnormal returns observed at announcement for a subset of stock repurchasing firms reflect the market's negative as-
sessment of the event due to firm specific factors.  Specifically, the following two hypotheses are examined: 
 
H1:  Firms in Group P and Group N are from the same population and there are no fundamental differences be-
tween the two groups. 
 
H2: Any negative market reaction to stock repurchase announcements is caused by anticipation, estimation er-
rors or confounding events and is not related to firm-specific factors. 
 
 Chow test and cross-section multi-variate regression models are used to test the hypotheses.  If a stock re-
purchase program is viewed as value-increasing for one group of firms and value-decreasing  for another because of 
the different characteristics of the firms, the firms in the two groups should be significantly different in some impor-
tant aspects.  At the same time, if the CARs for Group N are negative, on average, due to anticipation or estimation 
errors or other confounding events, there should be little relation between the observed CARs and the variables 
proxying for the determinants of the market reaction to stock repurchase announcements.  As such, the adjusted 
R-squared of the regression for Group N should be lower than that for Group P and that the announcement CAR for 
Group N should not be significantly related to the size of the repurchase. 
 
3.2 The Data 
 
 The data set consists of firms that announced open-market stock repurchases during the second half of 
2000.  The repurchase announcements are obtained from buybackletter.com.  These events are then verified by 
checking the Wall Street Journal Index.  The firms in the sample also pass the following screens: 
 
1. Common stock daily returns starting from 300 days before the repurchase announcement are available. 
2. There are no significant confounding announcements such as earnings reports within five days of the repur-
chasing announcement.  This measure is taken to avoid compounding market reaction to repurchase an-
nouncement with that of the earnings announcement. 
3. There are no major corporate restructuring within the 300 days before the repurchase announcement that 
would significantly change the nature or risk level of the firm, such as a merger or acquisition. 
4. The analysts‟ consensus estimates for the firm‟s current and next years‟ earnings are available from First 
Call Earnings Estimates. 
 
175 firms pass the screens. 
 
3.3 Estimation of repurchase announcement returns 
 
 Abnormal returns at repurchase announcement are estimated by employing an expanded market model, in-
cluding an industry index.  The coefficients are estimated using 300 days‟ return data prior to two days before the 
announcement.  In particular, the abnormal return of firm K at time t (ARkt) is defined as: 
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 ARkt = Rkt - k k Rmt 2k Rind,t),            (1) 
 
Where Rkt  is the observed return of firm k on day t 
 Rmt is the return on the index of the exchange this firm is listed 
 Rind,t  is the return on an equally-weighted portfolio of firms in the same industry as firm k on day t.  
Firms are considered to be in the same industry if the first three digits of the four-digit Standard 
Industry Classification Code (SIC) are the same. 
 
 Following previous studies, the market reaction to firm k's repurchase announcement is defined as the two-
day cumulative abnormal return (CARk).  It is the sum of firm k‟s abnormal return from day t-1 to day t.  Day t is the 
day  that the repurchase announcement appeared in the Wall Street Journal.  Thus, the two-day CAR is computed as 
the sum of firm K‟s abnormal return on days t-1 and t.  The basic assumption here is that the market immediately 
reassesses the company following the announcement of the stock repurchase program and reacts to it.  Of the 175 
firms in the sample, 118 firms (67.4%) have positive cumulative abnormal returns and 57 firms (32.6%) have nega-
tive abnormal returns.  The average two-day CAR for the whole sample is 2.37%.  The average CAR for the 118 
firms that have positive returns is 5.4%.  The average CAR for the 57 firms that have negative returns is -4.0%. 
 
3.4 Proxies for the determinants of repurchase abnormal returns 
 
 Cross-sectional regressions are performed on the full sample and the two sub-groups to examine the rela-
tionship between the variables that proxy for the determinants of repurchase abnormal returns and the observed an-
nouncement reaction and the explanatory powers of these variables in the two sub-groups.  The proxies used are as 
follows: 
 
1. Firm Size (SIZE): The firm size is measured as the natural log of the market value of equity as of two days 
before the announcement.  Zeghal (1983), Eddy and Seifert (1988), and Mitra and Owers (1990) argue that 
firm size is a good proxy for the degree of publicly available information about a firm; the larger the firm, 
the greater the availability of information.   Thus, the value of repurchase announcements conveying infor-
mation to the market may be greater for small firms than for large firms.  The sign of the coefficient is ex-
pected to be negative. 
2. Debt-to-Equity Ratio (Debt): The debt to equity ratio before the repurchase announcement was made. If 
part of the costs of a repurchase program is a reduction in financial slack, the debt level relative to equity 
prior to the repurchase clearly matters.  The data is from the sample firms‟ annual reports.  The sign is ex-
pected to be negative. 
3. Earnings Volatility   (EARNVOL): Earnings volatility  is estimated as the standard deviation of earnings 
per share over the 16 quarters immediately preceding the repurchase announcement.  If part of the benefit 
of a stock repurchase program is to convey managerial information to the market, then the information pro-
vided will be more valuable for firms with less predictable earnings.  On the other hand, for firms with sta-
ble earnings, the value of the additional information from the repurchase announcement may not be as sig-
nificant.  The sign is expected to be positive. 
4. Institutional holdings  (INST): The fraction of outstanding shares held by institutions is used as a proxy for 
the intensity of monitoring that the firm is subjected to by institutions.  It is hypothesized that the agency 
costs arising from the manager-stockholder conflict are smaller when institutions monitor the firm more 
closely.  Thus, the benefit of agency cost reduction may be smaller for firms with large institutional hold-
ings.  An alternative interpretation of this variable is that heavy institutional holdings are associated with 
greater information availability about the firm, reducing the signaling benefit from repurchase announce-
ments.  Both interpretations predict a negative coefficient. 
5. Insider Ownership  (INSIDER): The percentage of shares owned by directors and senior officers, and 
someone who owns more than 5% of the shares of the company.  It is used here as a proxy of the amount of 
monitoring activities.  Higher insider ownership should result in more intensive monitoring by the board, 
less serious agency problems, less benefit from the reduction of agency costs, and thus a greater likelihood 
of repurchase program being value-decreasing.  The sign is expected to be negative. 
6. Percent of Repurchase  (Rep): It is calculated as a percentage of the repurchase of the total shares outstand-
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ing at the time of the repurchase announcement.  To the extent that the repurchase announcement is unanti-
cipated, both the signaling and agency cost arguments predict that the abnormal return at announcement 
should be positively related to the relative size of the repurchase. 
7. Pre-Announcement CAR  (PRECAR): The CAR for each firm, from day -20 through day -2, is used to con-
trol for market anticipation of the repurchase announcement.  If observed negative abnormal returns result 
from market anticipation, PRECAR should be positive, and negatively related to the two-day announce-
ment CAR. 
8. Projected Earnings Growth Change  (PEARN): This is a dummy variable, taking on a value of 1 if the pro-
jected earnings growth for the next fiscal year is greater than the current year, as reported by the First Call 
Earnings Estimates and 0 otherwise.  This is a proxy for future growth and used to test whether market re-
sponse to repurchase announcement is related to projected future earnings and growth prospects. 
 
3.5 Chow Test 
 
 To test whether the variables in the two sub-groups are statistically different, a Chow test is performed.  If, 
as expected, there is indeed a subset of firms for which stock repurchase announcements is a value-decreasing event 
due to their firm specific factors, then the variables proxying for these factors should be different from those of the 
firms for which stock repurchase is a value-increasing event. The purpose of this test procedure is to see whether the 
null hypothesis (that the variables in the two groups are not different) can be rejected. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
3.1 Preliminary Results 
 
 Table 1 reports the mean of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions, for the entire sample, and 
separately for firms that experience a positive CAR at announcement (Group P), and those that experience a nega-
tive CAR (Group N).  For the purpose of this paper, 5% significance level is deemed satisfactory.  A comparison 
across the two groups gives a preliminary indication regarding the extent to which firms with negative CARs differ 
from those with positive CARs, in terms of ex ante characteristics.  If negative CARs stem from the degrees of leve-
rage, market anticipation, estimation errors and confounding events, we expect the two sub-samples to differ only 
with respect to variables that proxy for market anticipation. 
 
 While the CARs at announcement differ significantly across the two groups, this is only to be expected 
since the groups are formed on the basis of announcement CARs.  The sub-sample values of pre-announcement 
CARs (PRECAR) suggest that there is little difference between the two groups.  Both groups have  mean value of 
PRECAR that are negative and not significantly different from each other.   There is no evidence that the market 
reaction to the repurchase announcements is due to market anticipation. 
 
 However, the two groups are significantly different with respect to several other variables, such as firm 
size, debt-to-equity ratio, earnings volatility, institutional holdings, and projected earnings growth change.  The di-
rections of the differences are consistent with the theoretical predictions and tend to explain the difference in an-
nouncement CARs.  For instance, announcement CARs tend to be negative for larger firms (with greater availability 
of public information), and those with less volatile earnings.  In both cases, the value of future information releases 
is likely to be low.  Group N also has significantly higher debt-to-equity ratios than Group P, suggesting that the 
level of leverage may be negatively related to announcement returns. Negative announcement CAR firms are also 
characterized by large institutional holdings.  Thus, these are firms where agency costs are likely to be low to begin 
with because of closer institutional monitoring.  Overall, negative announcement CARs tend to occur when the ben-
efits of stock repurchase are likely to be small and the costs, such as reduction in financial slack, tend to be big, The 
preliminary findings are consistent with the notion that the announcement returns reflect the market‟s assessment of 
the benefits and costs associated with the repurchase program. 
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 The above results are suggestive of factors that determine the magnitude of CARs at the announcement of a 
stock repurchase program, and explain the incidence of negative CARs.  However, it is necessary to examine the in-
fluence of each factor while controlling for the other factors.  Cross-sectional regressions are conducted for this pur-
pose.  Another motivation is to compare the explanatory powers of the two regressions for the two sub-samples.  If 
they are roughly the same, then there are reasons to believe that the negative announcement CARs are driven by the 
underlying fundamental variables to the same extent as positive announcement CARs, rather than being caused by 
estimation errors or confounding events. 
 
3.2 Analysis 
 
 Cross-sectional regressions are used to examine the relationship between the dependent variable, the two-
day CARs, and the independent variables listed in Table 1.  The results of the full sample and the two sub-sample 
regressions are reported in Table 2. 
 
 For the full sample, the coefficient of firm size is significant and negative, consistent with the hypothesis 
that the larger the firm, the more information is available about the firm and the less valuable the repurchase an-
nouncement is in providing additional information.  The coefficient for debt-to-equity ratio is also significant and 
negative, as expected.  This suggests that the degree of leverage does have an impact on how the market reacts to re-
purchase announcements.  The higher the leverage, the more likely the announcement returns will be negative.  The 
coefficient of earnings volatility is positive and significant.  The more volatile the earnings are, the less information 
investors can get from earnings announcements in terms of the firm‟s future prospects and the more valuable the an-
nouncement of stock repurchase is.  The coefficient of institutional holdings is negative and significant, consistent 
with both the agency cost reduction and information effect hypotheses.  The size of repurchase has a positive and 
significant coefficient, consistent with the notion that if the repurchase announcement is good news, the more shares 
to be repurchased, the better.  The coefficient of projected earnings growth change is positive and significant, indi-
cating that investors take into account the future earnings prospects when reacting to the repurchase announcement.  
The coefficients of insider ownership and Precar are insignificant.  Overall, the regression explains 41% of the 
cross-sectional variation in announcement CARs. 
 
 For the two sub-sample regressions, the coefficient of the size of repurchase is significant and positive for 
Group P as predicted by both signaling and agency cost arguments but it is significant and negative for Group N.  
The coefficient of firm size is negative and significant for Group P but not significant for Group N.   Debt-to-equity 
is significant and negative for Group N, as expected.  The coefficients of  institutional holdings for both groups are 
significant and has the expected signs.  The regressions explain 28% of the cross-sectional variation in announce-
ment CARs for Group P and 34% for Group N. 
 
 The regression results from two sub-groups provide important evidence to reject the H2  and to support the 
contention that the observed negative announcement CARs for Group N is indicative of the market's assessment of 
the costs and benefits of a stock repurchase.  The different signs of the size of the repurchase show that the repur-
chase programs do convey very different information to the market for the two groups.  For Group P, the positive 
sign indicates that the repurchase program, in and of itself, is viewed as value-increasing, and the value increase is 
positively related to the percent of shares to be repurchased.  But for Group N, the repurchase, in and of itself, is 
viewed as value-decreasing, and the more shares to be repurchased, the greater decrease in value.  There is a general 
consensus that the signaling effect and the agency cost reduction are the main reasons why many firms experience 
positive market reaction when the announcements of stock repurchase are made.  The fact that the value of R-
squared for Group N is greater than that of Group P in the two sub-sample regressions indicates that the dependent 
variables are more closely related to the independent variables in Group N than that in Group P and that the negative 
reactions are due to these firm specific factors and not estimation errors.  This provides strong evidence to reject H2.. 
 
3.3 The Chow Test 
 
 The  result of the Chow test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the variables in 
Group P and Group N at the 1% significance level.  This clearly shows that there are indeed two groups of firms 
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with different firm specific characteristics that result in different market reaction to stock repurchase announce-
ments. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper examines the differential market reaction to stock repurchase announcements.  It offers evidence 
that stock-repurchasing firms fall into two distinct categories, with repurchase being a value-increasing event for 
one, and a value-decreasing event for the other due to different firm specific characteristics.  The results of this study 
strongly suggest that market reaction to stock repurchase announcements is based on the net effects of the costs and 
benefits of the repurchase program, which differ from firm to firm.  It shows that a seemingly positive corporate 
event, such as the announcement of stock repurchase, could very well be perceived by the market as having a nega-
tive impact on the value of the company for some firms due to firm specific factors. 
 
 
6. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 The findings of this paper may have implications for future studies on other corporate events, such as stock 
split, seasoned new issue, dividend omission, layoffs and so on.   It will be interesting to study whether there also 
exists a heterogeneous market reactions to these events and how market reactions are affected by various firm spe-
cific factors.  The answers to these questions will certainly deepen our understanding of the market implications of 
these important corporate events.   
 
 
Table 1 
 
The means of the variables of interest for the full sample, and for subgroups based on whether the CAR at announcement is posi-
tive (Group P), or negative CAR (Group N). 
 
Variable Full Sample 
(N=175) 
Group P 
Car > 0 
(N=118) 
Group N 
Car < 0 
(N=57) 
SIZE 2,209 m* 1,577 m 3,497 m** 
DEBT/EQUITY 3.166 1.930 5.400** 
EARNVOL 0.220 0.260 0.130** 
INST 13.480 8.160 21.760** 
INSIDER 35.000 34.700 36.000 
REP 0.080 0.090 0.070 
PRECAR -4.600 -4.000 -5.000 
PEARN 0.650 0.740 0.470** 
Car 2.370 5.400 -4.030** 
 
* The numbers reported here are in millions. However, in the regression models, natural log of the market value is used. 
**P = .05. Group P vs. Group N. 
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Table 2 
 
Results of multi-variate, cross-sectional regressions. 
T-statistics are reported in the parentheses.  The sub-groups are formed based on CAR.  Group P consists of 118 firms with posi-
tive CARs and Group N consists of 57 firms with negative CARs. 
 
 Full Group P Group N 
Variables 175 118 57 
Intercept 0.11*     (2.11) 
 
 
)222222222222222222 
0.13*   (2.05) 0.01      (1.34) 
Size -0.02*  (2.15) -0.02*  (1.96) -0.05    (0.98) 
Debt/Equity -0.17* (2.25) -0.02 (0.76) -0.21* (2.86) 
Earnvol 0.08*   (3.24) 0.01    (0.74) .019   (1.33) 
Inst -0.08*   (2.18) 0.04*    (2.07) -0.03** (2.76) 
Insider 0.01      (0.44) 0.02    (0.26) 0.01     (0.33) 
Rep 1.98*    (2.12) 3.53* (3.86) -2.34** (3.28) 
Precar -0.02     (1.08) -0.01    (0.70) -0.04     (0.49) 
Pearn 0.04*    (2.23) 0.02    (0.46) 0.01     (0.86) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.28 0.34 
F-Statistics 11.02* 4.95* 5.07* 
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